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H.B. 1168:

THE BURDEN OF PROVING AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

I.

INTRODUCTION

The burden of proof' for an affirmative defense' in a criminal prosecution was recently revised by H.B. 1168.' The new statute provides
that:
Every person accused of an offense is presumed innocent until proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof for all
elements of the offense is upon the prosecution. The burden of going forward with the evidence of an affirmative defense, and the burden of
proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, for an affirmative defense, is
upon the accused."

The purpose of H.B. 1168 was to place the burden of proving an affirmative defense on the accused. 5
This note will discuss the origin and effect of H.B. 1168. The first
part will summarize the Ohio law on affirmative defenses. This will be
followed by United States Supreme Court decisions and Ohio cases
which have discussed the defendant's burden of proof and affirmative
defenses. Finally, the constitutionality of H.B. 1168 and its impact on
Ohio criminal justice will be examined.

II.
A.

ANALYSIS

Background of H.B. 1168

In 1974, the Ohio General Assembly codified the requirements for
proving an affirmative defense in a criminal prosecution. The assembly
enacted Ohio Revised Code section 2901.05(A), which stated: "Every
1. The phrase 'burden of proof' means both the burden of persuasion and the
burden of going forward with the evidence.
In legal discussion, this phrase, "the burden of proof," is used in several ways. It
marks, (1) The peculiar duty of him who has the risk of any given proposition on
which parties are at issue; - who will lose the case if he does not make this proposition out, when all has been said and done ....(2) It stands for the duty.., of
going forward in argument or in producing evidence; whether at the beginning of
a case or at any later moment throughout the trial or the discussion ....
J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 355 (1969).
2. In Ohio, an affirmative defense is defined as either "[a] defense expressly
designated as affirmative; or [a]defense involving an excuse or justification peculiarly
within the knowledge of the accused, or which he can fairly be required to adduce supporting evidence." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2901.05(C)(l)-(2) (Page Supp. 1979).
3. Am. Sub. H.B. 1168, 112th Gen. Assembly (1978) (codified in part at OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.05(A) (Page Supp. 1979)) (effective Nov. 1, 1978).
4. Id.
5. Telephone interview with Ohio State Representative Harold Lehman, sponsor
of H.B. 1168 (Jan. 24, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Lehman Telephone Interview].
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person accused of an offense is presumed innocent until proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof is upon the prosecution. The burden of going forward with the evidence of an affirmative defense is upon the accused. ' 6 This statute did not specify which
party had the burden of proving an affirmative defense. The omission
created a problem. Ohio courts have previously applied the common

law whenever an affirmative defense was asserted.' Under common
law, the accused had the burden of proving an affirmative defense by a
preponderance of the evidence.' The common law tradition and the
ambiguity of the statute created difficulty for the courts.
The Ohio Supreme Court reviewed the statute in State v. Robinson.' The court determined that section 2901.05(A) was intended to
eliminate the defendant's common law burden of proving an affirmative defense. To support this conclusion, reference was made to the
Ohio House Technical Committee's comments which described the intended effect of section 2901.05(A): 10
The plain import of this language is that when the burden of going forward with the evidence of an affirmative defense is placed upon the
defendant, it is intended that the defendant need only raise a reasonable
doubt of his guilt in order to gain acquittal, and need not prove the
defense by a preponderance of the evidence, or any other standard."

Robinson disregarded the common law and held that under the
statute the defendant did not have the burden of proving self-defense
by a preponderance of the evidence.'
6. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.05(A) (Page 1975). This provision is amended
by H.B. 1168. See note 3 supra.
7. State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St. 2d 18, 19, 294 N.E.2d 888, 889 (1973); State v.
Vargo, 116 Ohio St. 495, 507, 156 N.E. 600, 601 (1927). "Prior to 1974, Ohio's treatment of affirmative defenses in criminal cases followed the common law tradition, i.e.,
if a defendant intended to rely upon one of the recognized 'affirmative defenses,' he
bore the burden of proving that defense by a preponderance of the evidence." Comment, Affirmative Defenses in Ohio After Mullaney v. Wilbur, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 828,
828 (1975).
8. State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St. 2d 18, 19, 294 N.E.2d 888, 889 (1973).
9. 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 351 N.E.2d 88 (1976). The defendant, George Robinson,
Jr., was charged with aggravated murder for the shooting death of his nephew on June
29, 1974. He was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. On appeal the conviction was
reversed and a motion for leave to appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court was granted. The
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate decision. Id.
10. Id. at 110 n.10, 351 N.E.2d at 94 n.10.
11. Id. "If the General Assembly had wished to impose the burden of persuasion
as well as the burden of going forward with the evidence, we may properly assume that
they would have used language appropriate to do so." Id. at 110, 351 N.E.2d at 93.
12. "In a criminal case involving the affirmative defense of self-defense, the
defendant has only the burden of going forward with evidence of a nature and quality
sufficient to raise that defense, and does not have the burden of establishing such by a
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss2/11
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H.B. 1168 was passed as a response to Robinson.'3 The sponsors
felt that the court misinterpreted section 2901.05(A), and they hoped
H.B. 1168 would clarify the assembly's intent."' H.B. 1168 amends
section 2901.05(A) in two respects. First, it adds that the burden of
proof "for all elements" of the offense is upon the prosecution who
must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' 5 Second, the bill places
the burden of proving an affirmative defense by a preponderance of
the evidence upon the accused.' 6 The reason for so allocating this
burden is that the facts constituting an affirmative defense are
presumably within the exclusive knowledge and disposal of the accused. '7
B.

United States Supreme Court Decisions

The United States Supreme Court recently examined the burden of
proof in a criminal prosecution as well as the constitutionality of state
statutes which require the defendant to prove an affirmative defense.'I
From these decisions the conflict between H.B. 1168 and the federal
Constitution can be seen.
In re Winship'9 concerned "whether proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is among the 'essentials of due process and fair treatment' required during the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is charged with an
act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult." 20 Winship involved a twelve year old boy who stole money from a pocketbook. The petition charged him with delinquency and alleged that the
act would constitute larceny if it had been done by an adult. 2 ' The
Court stated that an innocent child is protected by the same considerapreponderance of the evidence. (R.C. 2901.05(A) construed)" Id. at 103, 351 N.E.2d
at 89 (syllabus of the court). The court reaffirmed its interpretation of § 2901.05(A)
that the defendant does not have the burden of establishing an affirmative defense by a
preponderance in State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 2d 95, 364 N.E.2d 1354 (1977).
13. See Lehman Telephone Interview, supra note 5.
14. The sponsors of H.B. 1168 wanted to restore the common law tradition of
having the defendant prove an affirmative defense by a preponderance. This was supported by the Ohio Prosecutors Association which lobbied for the enactment of H.B.
1168. The association felt it was more equitable to have the defendant bear this burden
because the facts constituting an affirmative defense are only known to the accused.
See Lehman Telephone Interview, supra note 5.
15. Compare OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.05(A) (Page 1975) with id. §
2901.05(A) (Page Supp. 1979).
16. Id.
17. Lehman Telephone Interview, supra note 5.
18. See notes 19-66 and accompanying text infra.
19. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
20. Id. at 359.
21. Id. at 360.
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tions given to an innocent adult." Due process requires that no person
will lose his liberty unless the state has convinced the fact finder of the
defendant's guilt. "3 The Court formally adopted the standard of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because it reduces the risk of erroneous convictions," provides substance for the presumption of innocence, 5 and promotes public confidence in the enforcement of
criminal justice. Winship held "that the due process clause protects
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged." 7
22. Id. at 365. The Court relied on In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), to decide that
the reasonable doubt standard is an essential element of due process and therefore
mandatory in an adjudicatory hearing for juveniles. In Gault, the Court determined
that subjecting a delinquent minor to the loss of his liberty is comparable in seriousness
to a felony prosecution. Id. at 36. Although the Court in Gault held that due process
requires the essentials of due process and fair treatment to be applied during the adjudicatory hearing, the Court did not require the hearing to conform with all the requirements of a criminal trial or usual administrative hearing. Id. at 30 (citing Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1960)).
23. 397 U.S. at 364 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958)).
There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding,
which both parties must take into account. Where one party has at stake an interest of transcending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-this margin of
error is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the burden
of... persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Due process commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless
the Government has borne the burden of .

. .

convincing the factfinder of his

guilt. Id.
To this extent, the Winship Court considered the reasonable doubt standard indispensable because it impresses on the trier of fact the need to reach a subjective state of certainty regarding the facts in issue. 397 U.S. at 364.
24. Id.at 363.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 364. "The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American
scheme of criminal procedure." Id.at 363. The importance lies in the interests of the
individual and society during a criminal prosecution. The accused may suffer a loss of
liberty upon conviction and most certainly will be stigmatized by the conviction. Id.
Therefore, a society which values the "good name and freedom of every individual
should not condemn a man when there is a reasonable doubt about his guilt." Id.at
364. Society's interest is reflected in the respect and confidence that the community
must have for the application of the criminal law. The moral force of criminal law may
be diluted if the standard of proof leaves people in doubt as to whether innocent men
are being condemned. Id.at 364. Thus, the individual and society have important interests in protecting the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id.
The importance of these factors was also recognized by the Court in invalidating
the Maine murder statute in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). See notes 28-42
and accompanying text infra.
27. 397 U.S. at 364. The United States Constitution provides that "[N]o person
shall ...

be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . ..."

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss2/11
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In Mullaney v. Wilbur,"8 the Court examined the impact of Winship in proving an affirmative defense. Wilbur was convicted under a
Maine murder statute.29 He admitted attacking the deceased but claimed
that this action was provoked. The defendant argued that he lacked
malice and criminal intent because he acted in the heat of passion. On
appeal to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, Wilbur argued that Winship required the state to prove malice beyond a reasonable doubt.
Under the Maine murder statute, malice aforethought was an essential
element of the crime, and therefore, the prosecution had the burden of
proving it. The court affirmed the conviction and held that the prosecution could rest on a presumption of implied malice. This presumption places the burden on the defendant to prove he acted in the heat
of passion in order to reduce the charge to manslaughter.3"
A federal district court, upon writ of habeas corpus, reversed the
conviction." The First Circuit, relying on Winship, affirmed. It conU.S. CONST. amend. V. The fourteenth amendment provides that a state shall not
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
Due process analysis is characterized as either substantive or procedural. Substantive due process analyzes the constitutional limit on the content of legislative action.
See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 427 (1978). Procedural due process

delineates the constitutional limits on judicial, executive, and administrative enforcement of the legislative dictates. Id. at 502.
Procedural due process has focused on the federal rights of individuals in state
criminal proceedings. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 486 (1975). The traditional view was that fundamental rights of liberty and justice
were constitutionally required in state proceedings. Id. at 506. The traditional approach has been challenged by those who believe that the fourteenth amendment incor-

porates the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Id. (See Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319 (1937) and Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) for an examination of
the issues raised in the incorporation controversy).
The essence of the constitutional claim in Winship was that due process required a
criminal conviction to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The significance of Winship is that the Court found that the reasonable doubt standard reflects "a profound

judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered."
397 U.S. at 362 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968)). The Court's
holding in Winship, therefore, constitutionalizes the accused's fundamental right to a
conviction based on a reasonable doubt standard.
28. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).

29. At the time of the Mullaney decision, the Maine murder statute read:
"Whoever unlawfully kills a human being with malice aforethought, either express or
implied, is guilty of murder and shall be punished by imprisonment for life." ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 2651 (1965).
The manslaughter statute read in part: "Whoever unlawfully kills a human being in
the heat of passion, or sudden provocation, without express or implied malice
aforethought... shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1000 or by imprisonment for not more than 20 years. . .

."

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 2651 (1965).

30.

State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139 (Me. 1971).

31.

Wilbur v. Robbins, 349 F.Supp. 149 (D. Me. 1972). The district court held

that the Maine court had improperly interpreted Winship. The federal district court
Published by eCommons, 1980
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cluded that malice is an element of murder under the Maine law, and
the prosecution must prove malice beyond a reasonable doubt."
Following this decision, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court decided
an intervening case, State v. Lafferty,3 3 and repudiated the First Circuit's decision in Mullaney. Lafferty held that the Maine homicide
statute did not require the prosecution to prove that a defendant acted
in the heat of passion. In light of Lafferty, the United States Supreme
Court remanded Mullaney to the First Circuit which again found that
the prosecution must prove that the accused did not act in the heat of
passion. 3 ' The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the decision of the First Circuit."
The individual's due process interest in liberty and reputation was
the basis for the Court's holding the Maine statute invalid.1 6 The
statute invaded these interests by increasing the likelihood of imprisonment and the stigma on an individual's reputation. The presumption
of malice directly affected criminal culpability. 7 The court found great
read the Maine statute to consist of two distinct crimes distinguished by malice
aforethought. As distinct crimes, the prosecution had the burden of proving an absence
of malice beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 153.
32. Wilbur v. Mullaney, 473 F.2d 943 (1st Cir. 1973).
33. 309 A.2d 647 (Me. 1973).
34. Wilbur v. Mullaney, 496 F.2d 1303 (1st Cir. 1974).
35. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). Although the Court affirmed the
First Circuit, they rejected that circuit's analysis that murder and manslaughter are
distinct crimes. Because the state courts are the final expositors of state law, the
Supreme Court, except in extreme circumstances, is bound by state court constructions. Id. at 691. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court had found that murder and
manslaughter were not distinct crimes, but that they were different degrees of the
single generic offense of felonious homicide. State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139 (Me. 1971).
36. 421 U.S. at 697-98.
37. Id. at 697. Petitioners argued that the defendant's interests in Mullaney were
significantly different than the defendant's interests in Winship. See note 26 supra.
Petitioners maintained that "the defendant's critical interests in liberty and reputation
are no longer of paramount concern since, irrespective of the presence or absence of
the heat of passion or sudden provocation, he is likely to lose his liberty and certain to
be stigmatized." 421 U.S. at 697.
The Mullaney Court, however, determined that:
In Winship, the ultimate burden of persuasion remained with the prosecution ....
In this case, by contrast, the State has affirmatively shifted the burden of proof to
the defendant. The result, in a case such as this one where the defendant is required to prove the critical fact in dispute is to increase further the likelihood of
an erroneous murder conviction.
Id. at 700-01 (emphasis added).
The Mullaney Court further stated that "It is far worse to sentence one guilty only
of manslaughter as a murderer than to sentence a murderer for the lesser crime of
manslaughter." Id. at 703-04 (paraphrasing Justice Harlan concurring in Winship. See
397 U.S. at 372). But see note 119 infra.
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disparity between convictions of murder and manslaughter.3" This
marked disparity was important due to the differing severity of
sentences. The Mullaney Court struck down the law in order to protect
the accused's interest in his liberty and reputation from this statutory
invasion.
The Maine statute distinguished the culpability of those who killed
in the heat of passion from those who killed in the absence of
passion." Once felonious homicide was proved, the accused was required to show by a preponderance that he acted in the heat of passion.' 0 By meeting this burden, homicide was reduced to manslaughter."'
If this burden was not met, the defendant was presumed to have acted
maliciously, and therefore, was guilty of murder.' 2 The Supreme Court
held that the presumption of malice shifted the burden of proving this
element to the accused.' 3 Absence of provocation was a necessary
element of the crime because it differentiated murder from manslaughter." The Court invalidated the Maine law and held that the
statute unconstitutionally relieved the prosecution of its obligation
under Winship to prove every element of the crime.' Once the issue is
38. Although the Court accepted the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's interpretation of the statute, the consequences resulting from the convictions were significantly
different. 421 U.S. at 698. "Indeed, when viewed in terms of the potential difference
in restrictions of personal liberty attendant to each conviction, the distinction established by Maine between murder and manslaughter may be of greater importance than
the difference between guilt or innocence for many lesser crimes." Id.
39. Id. at 698.
First, the fact at issue here-the presence or absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation-has been, almost from the inception of the common law of
homicide, the single most important factor in determining the degree of culpability attaching to an unlawful homicide. And, second, the clear trend has been
toward requiring the prosecution to bear the ultimate burden of proving this fact.
Id. at 696.
40. The Court was concerned with the substance of the statute and not its formal
relation to the requirements of Winship. Id. at 699. The Court evaluated the effect and
implications of the statute. Viewed in its totality and in light of the interests expressed
in Winship, the burden placed on the defendant was unconstitutional. Id. at 700-01.
41. Id. at 688.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 701. By shifting this burden to the defendant, the likelihood of an
erroneous murder conviction is increased. Id. at 701. The interests of the individual in
his liberty and reputation were also invaded by the Maine statute. See notes 36-38
supra. The interests of the individual and society were more significantly affected than
in Winship. 421 U.S. at 700. Wilbur faced a possible sentence ranging from a nominal
fine to life imprisonment. Further, "the stigma to the defendant and the community's
confidence in the administration of the criminal law are also of greater consequence in
this case . .

. ."

Id.

44. Id. at 704.
45. Id.
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properly raised, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant did not act in the heat of passion."'
Two years after Mullaney, the Court again reviewed the burden of
proving an affirmative defense. Patterson v. New York' involved a
murder conviction. Patterson shot his wife's lover upon observing his
wife semiappareled in the presence of the deceased. He was charged
with second degree murder.' Second degree murder, in New York,
consists of two elements: (1) intent to cause the death of another; and
(2) causing the death of another person or a third person.' 9 Unlike the
statute challenged in Mullaney, malice aforethought is not included as
an element of murder.'" The statute reviewed in Patterson, however,
46. Id. at 701-02. "Mullaney thus expanded due process requirements to include
facts that mitigate the punishment as well as 'facts necessary to constitute the crime.'"
Note, Affirmative Defense After Mullaney v. Wilbur: New York's Extreme Emotional
Disturbance, 43 BROOKLYN L. REv. 171, 180 (1976). Compare id. with R. Allen, The
Restoration of In Re Winship: A Comment on the Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal
Cases After Patterson v. New York, 76 MICH. L. REV. 30 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Allen], in which the author states: "Mullaney, carried to its logical extreme, would
seem to forbid the use of all affirmative defenses." 76 MICH. L. REv. at 39.
Thus Mullaney, which purported to "apply" Winship, drastically altered that case
from one that looks to traditional practice and prevailing usage by the states to aid
in due process analysis to one that frees the federal courts to impose their own
view about the appropriate use of the reasonable doubt standard on the states notwithstanding widely shared views to the contrary.
Id. at 40.
47. 432 U.S. 197 (1977). For an extensive analysis of Patterson, see 43 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 171, supra note 46.
48. Section 125.25 of the New York penal law provides in part:
A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when: 1. With intent to cause
the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or a third person,
except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, it is an affirmative defense
that: (a) the defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance
for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse ....
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1975).
Section 125.20 of the New York penal law provides in part:
2. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such
person or of a third person under circumstances which do not constitute murder
because he acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance. . . . The
fact that homicide was committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance constitutes a mitigating circumstance reducing murder to manslaughter
in the first degree and need not be proved in any prosecution initiated under this
subdivision.
Id. § 125.20.
49. Id. §§ 125.25, 125.20. See also Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206
(1977).
50. Cdmpare note 29 with text accompanying note 44 supra. The New York law
differs from the Maine statute struck down in Mullaney. Under New York's law, the
prosecution must prove all the elements of the crime, which are intent and causation.
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206 (1977). Malice is not an element of murder
in New York, and proof of extreme emotional disturbance does not negate an element
of the crime. Id. at 206-07.
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permits the accused to raise an affirmative defense.' If the defendant
proves extreme emotional disturbance, second degree murder will be
mitigated to manslaughter."
Patterson asserted extreme emotional disturbance but was convicted. He appealed, claiming that the New York murder statute was
invalid under Mullaney. The New York Court of Appeals rejected the
claim." Mullaney was distinguished on the grounds that the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance did not bear a direct
relationship to any element of murder under the New York statute.
The burden to "disprove any fact essential to the offense charged"
does not shift to the defendant."' The Supreme Court affirmed this
decision." The Court stated that the affirmative defense does not
negate any fact' of the crime which the prosecution must prove in
order to convict the defendant." Extreme emotional disturbance is a
51. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
52. The defendant must prove the affirmative defense by a preponderance. The
defense, which is a mitigating circumstance, does not presume or infer any other facts
which constitute the crime. 432 U.S. at 205-06. The Court also found that under the
New York law, manslaughter was defined in a separate section of the statute. Id. In
Mullaney, the Maine law of felonious homicide was a single offense composed of
murder and manslaughter. In the Maine statute, malice was presumed and therefore
became an element of the crime. 421 U.S. at 685-86.
53. People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 347 N.E.2d 848, 383 N.Y.S. 573 (1976).
54. Id. at 301-03, 347 N.E.2d at 907-08, 383 N.Y.S. 581-82.
55. 432 U.S. at 201. The Court referred to a line of cases upholding the defendant's burden of proving insanity by a preponderance. In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S.
790 (1952), the Court held that under the due process clause, the Oregon requirement
of having the defendant prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt was not unconstitutional. The prosecution still had the burden of proving all elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 795. See also Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877
(1976), in which the Court affirmed the constitutionality of a Delaware statute which
required the defendant to prove the affirmative defense of insanity by a preponderance. Patterson, however, was not concerned with insanity but considered essentially
the same defense which was reviewed in Mullaney. See note 67 infra.
56. The Court in Mullaney discussed the "elements" of a crime while the Court
in Pattersondiscussed the "facts" of a crime. "In essence the PattersonCourt evaded
Mullaney by reviving the formal distinction between an element of the crime and a fact
necessary for a defense to criminal liability." Jeffries and Stephan, Defense, Presumptions, and Burden of Proofin the CriminalLaw, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1342 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Jeffries and Stephan]. Other commentators have distinguished the cases
on different grounds. "Thus, one significant aspect of Patterson is, in short, the
restoration of Winship to its original purpose and the concomitant refusal to permit
Winship to be misconstrued and then employed as the basis for unjustifiable extensions of federal authority." Allen, supra note 46, at 40 (footnote omitted). Allen views
Patterson as clearly overruling Mullaney, even though the Court did not see it this
way. "My treatment of Mullaney v. Wilbur has been based on the conclusion that Patterson overruled Mullaney, and so indeed I think it did." Id. at 53-54.
57. 432 U.S. at 206-07.
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separate issue for which the defendant is required to bear the burden
of proof.5 8
Pattersonplaces the burden of proof on the prosecution if an affirmative defense negates a fact of the crime. 9 If the affirmative defense
does not negate a fact of the crime, then the burden may constitutionally be placed on the defendant. 60 It logically follows that a court
must be concerned with two issues: (1) what are the facts of the crime
for which the accused is brought to trial? and (2) does the affirmative
defense raised by the accused negate any of those facts?
Justice Powell, the author of the majority opinion in Mullaney,
dissented in Patterson. "The test the court today establishes allows a
legislature to shift, virtually at will, the burden of persuasion with
respect to any factor in a criminal case so long as it is careful not to
mention the non-existence of that factor in the statutory language that
defines the crime.'"' The majority in Pattersonrecognized this objection that state legislatures may reallocate the burden of proof by labeling facts of a crime as affirmative defenses.6 2 Nevertheless, the Court
noted that states are limited in this regard. 63 "It would be an abuse of
affirmative defenses, as it would be of presumptions in the criminal
law, if the purpose or effect were to unhinge the procedural presumption of innocence which historically and constitutionally shields one
64
charged with crime."
Both Mullaney and Pattersonconcern the burden of proving a heat
of passion defense. While the statute in Mullaney specifically mentions
58. Id. "The Due Process Clause, as we see it, does not put New York to the
choice of abandoning these defenses or undertaking to disprove their existence in order
to convict of a crime which otherwise is within its constitutional powers to sanction by
substantial punishment." Id. at 207-08. The recognition of "a mitigating circumstance
does not require the state to prove its non-existence in each case in which the fact is put
in issue, if in its judgment this would be too cumbersome, too expensive, and too inaccurate." Id. at 209 (footnote omitted).
59. Id. at 206-07.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 223 (Powell, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 210. The Court, however, refused to hold that those states which do not
assume the burden of disproving an affirmative defense violate the constitution. Id. at
211. "We thus decline to adopt as a constitutional imperative, operative countrywide,
that a state must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and
all affirmative defenses related to the culpability of the accused." Id. at 210.
63. Id. "We therefore will not disturb the balance struck in previous cases holding that the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt all the elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant
is charged." Id. Compare id. with Allen, supra notes 46 and 56.
64. 432 U.S. at 211 n.13 (quoting People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 305-07,
347 N.E.2d 898, 909-10, 383 N.Y.S. 571, 583 (1976) (Breitel, C.J., concurring)).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss2/11

LEGISLATION NOTES

1980]

heat of passion,6 5 the New York law refers to extreme emotional
disturbance." The latter "issimply 'a new formulation' for the traditional language of heat of passion. '" 7 The Supreme Court does not
clearly distinguish Patterson from the holding in Mullaney that "the
Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the absence of heat of passion or sudden provocation
when the issue is properly presented in a homicide case." 6 The decisions discuss "functionally identical statutes, one striking down and
the other upholding the statutory scheme." 69 This creates uncertainty

as to the status of the law in proving an affirmative defense."'
C.

Ohio Cases

In State v. Frost,7 the Ohio Supreme Court applied the principles
articulated in Winship, Mullaney, and Patterson. Frost was convicted

for selling securities without a license during 1975 and 1976. Frost
claimed the transaction fell within the good faith exemption of the
Ohio Securities Act. 72 The Act provides that the burden of proving an
exemption is on the party who claims it.' 3 The trial court instructed the
jury that the defendant had the burden of proving the74 exemption
defense by a preponderance. The jury found Frost guilty.
The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed and examined unamended

section 2901.05(A).' It considered whether the defendant had the
burden of proving an affirmative defense. It held that the defendant
only had the burden of going forward with enough evidence to raise

the exemption defense.' 6 The Ohio Supreme Court reversed this deci65. See note 29 supra.
66. See note 44 supra.
67. 432 U.S. at 207. "[In revising its criminal code, New York provided the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, a substantially expanded version of
the older heat of passion concept." Id. See also Note, Criminal Law: Affirmative
Defense in Criminal Trials- What are the Limits After Patterson v. New York?, 31
OKLA.

L.

REV.

411, 419 (1978).

68. 421 U.S. at 704.
69. Jeffries and Stephan, supra note 56, at 1342.
70. Id. The uncertainty arises because Pattersonhas not sufficiently distinguished
Mullaney so that definitive guidelines are apparent for state legislatures to follow when
drafting criminal laws on the burden of proving affirmative defenses. See, e.g., Note,
The Constitutionality of Affirmative Defenses After Patterson v. New York, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 655 (1978).
71. 57 Ohio St. 2d 121, 387 N.E.2d 235 (1979).

72.

See OHiO REV.

CODE

ANN. §§ 1707.01-.99 (Page 1978).

73. Id. § 1707.45.
74. See 57 Ohio St. 2d at 122, 387 N.E.2d at 236.
75. Id. Section 2901.05(A) of the Ohio Revised Code was unamended in the sense
that H.B. 1168 had not yet been passed. See note 3 supra.
76. See 57 Ohio St. 2d at 122, 387 N.E.2d at 236.
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sion and upheld the conviction of the defendant."' The court stated
that Winship did not directly address the constitutionality of requiring
the accused to bear the burden of proving an affirmative defense."8
Winship merely held that the prosecution must prove every fact of a
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 9
The Ohio Supreme Court further noted that Mullaney need not be
read to the prosecution to disprove an affirmative defense.8 In fact,
after Patterson, there is no doubt that Mullaney "does not stand for
the proposition that the prosecution must constitutionally carry the
burden of proof on affirmative defenses ..
"8"
Indeed, the Ohio
Supreme Court read Patterson to say that "an affirmative defense,
which does not negate any facts of the crime which the state must prove
in order to convict, constitutes a separate issue concerning which the
defendant is required to carry the burden of proof."8 Thus, in
holding that the state does not assume the burden of disproving an affirmative defense which does not negate a fact of the crime, the Frost
Court was attempting to be consistent with the rule of Patterson.83
In Cherry v. Jago,1"a federal district court considered whether the
defendant should bear the burden of proving self-defense to a murder
charge. James Cherry encountered the deceased in a drinking establishment. The deceased, who was known to Cherry, asked to borrow some
money. Cherry refused and an altercation ensued, wherein Cherry was
knocked to the floor and dragged outside. Once outside, the deceased
again approached the petitioner for money. Cherry recalled threats
made on his life by the deceased during previous encounters and knew
that the deceased carried a gun. Cherry, who had a gun, fired two warn77.
78.
79.
question

Id. at 128, 387 N.E.2d at 239.
Id. at 126, 387 N.E.2d at 238.
Id. Compare id. with Allen, supra note 46. "Winship did not present the
whether 'every fact necessary to constitute the crime need be proven beyond a

reasonable doubt' . . . . The case raised the question whether a 'conviction' could be

obtained upon proof only by a preponderance of the evidence." R. Allen, supra note

46, at 31 n.8.

80. 57 Ohio St. 2d at 126, 387 N.E.2d at 239. "[T]o read Mullaney v. Wilbur as
standing for the proposition that the prosecution is constitutionally required to disprove affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt, is to read it too broadly." Id.
at 126, 387 N.E.2d at 238.
81. Id. at 127, 387 N.E.2d at 239.

82. Id. This is consistent with the reasoning in Mullaney and Patterson. The
Maine statute was invalidated because the defendant was required to negate the element of malice aforethought by proving he acted in the heat of passion. 421 U.S. at
687. The New York law, however, did not require the defendant to negate an element

of the crime and therefore the statute was upheld. 432 U.S. at 206-07.
83. See 57 Ohio St. 2d at 127, 387 N.E.2d at 239.
84.

No. C-77-269A (N.D. Ohio Dec. 19, 1979).
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ing shots to discourage another altercation. Cherry then fired a third
shot, this time at the deceased. Cherry claimed self-defense, but was
convicted of murder. 5 Cherry petitioned the northern district court for
habeas corpus relief. He claimed that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that the defendant was required to prove self-defense by a
preponderance of the evidence."' At the time of Cherry's trial the
unamended provision of section 2901.05(A) was in effect." Cherry
also argued that once the accused properly raises the affirmative
defense, the burden is on the prosecution to prove the absence of selfdefense." Finally, Cherry contended that the Ohio Constitution requires all indictments to contain an allegation of unlawfulness. By
asserting self-defense, Cherry argued that he negated an element of the
crime.
The district court upheld Cherry's conviction and found that the
state trial court had not placed the burden of proving self-defense
upon the petitioner. 9 The record of the trial proceeding indicated that,
in accord with unamended section 2901.05(A), the judge instructed the
jury that Cherry had the burden of going forward with any evidence of
self-defense and that the state had the burden of proving every essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 0
After resolving the issue of the trial court's jury instruction, the
district court considered whether the absence of self-defense is an element of the crime of murder in Ohio. The relevant portion of the
murder statute provides: "No person shall purposely cause the death
of another."" The court reasoned that:
85. Petitioner's Brief on Merits Pursuant to Remand at 3-4, Cherry v. Jago, No.
C-77-269A (N.D. Ohio Dec. 19, 1979) [hereinafter referred to as Petitioner's Brief].
86. Cherry v. Jago, No. C-77-269A, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 19, 1979).
87. Id. at 9 n.6. Under the unamended statute, the defendant did not have the
burden of proving an affirmative defense by a preponderance. See text accompanying
notes 9-12 supra.
88. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 85, at 11-13. Cherry supported this contention
by referring to a Michigan case, Berrier v. Egeler, 583 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978). The petitioner was charged with murder. The court affirmed a finding that the petitioner's due process rights were violated as a result of the
trial court's failure to place upon the state the burden of proving the absence of the
petitioner's asserted self-defense. Id.

Like federal law, Michigan law requires that when self-defense is injected into a
trial by the introduction... of some evidence supporting the claim, the burden is
upon the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt not only each element of the
crime charged but also that the defendant did not act in self defense.
Id. at 523 (Engel, J., dissenting). The Cherry court, however, found the Berrierdecision unpersuasive. Cherry v. Jago, No. C-77-269A, slip op. at 13 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 19,

1979).
89. Cherry v. Jago, No. C-77-269A, slip op. at 5 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 19, 1979).
90. Id. at 5-6.
91. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.02 (Page 1975). In full, the statute provides:
Published by eCommons, 1980

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:2

Two sources of Ohio law support a finding that the absence of selfdefense is not an element necessary to constitute the crime of murder:
first, the common law principles establishing self-defense as an affirmative defense; and second, the statutory scheme defining the substantive elements of the crime of murder.9 2

Self-defense is not an element of murder. A defendant who asserts
self-defense admits to the conduct that serves as the basis for the crime
with which he is charged, but he atempts to avoid criminal liability by
demonstrating the existence of exigent circumstances justifying his
conduct." The court continued:
For any crime charged there are at least two material elements which the
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that the accused
voluntarily committed a proscribed act or failed to meet a prescribed duty; and (2) that the accused has the requisite degree of culpability as
specified by the section defining the offense.
To convict the petitioner of murder, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt ... (1) that he acted in such
a manner as to cause the victim's death, and (2) that he did so
purposely."

The district court's analysis of the Ohio murder statute concluded that
the absence of self-defense is not an element of the crime and,
therefore, the prosecution does not have the burden of proving its

absence.9"
While the district court correctly recognized that the absence of
self-defense is not a statutory element of murder, the court did not address Cherry's third contention that the claim of self-defense negates
the general allegation of unlawfulness that the Ohio Constitution requires to be contained in every indictment. 9 ' This contention was sup"(A) No person shall purposely cause the death of another. (B) Whoever violates this
section is guilty of murder, and shall be punished as provided in section 2929.02 of the
Revised Code." Id.
92. Cherry v. Jago, No. C-77-269A, slip op. at 8 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 19, 1979).
93. Id. at 10. "Thus, 'a plea of self-defense is inconsistent with the claim that the
defendant did not commit the homicide.' "Id. (quoting 27 0. JUR. 2d Homicide § 89
(1957)).
94. Id. at 10-11 (citations omitted).
95. Id. at 13. The court relied on the statement in Pattersonthat a state does not
have to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact constituting an affirmative
defense related to the culpability of the accused to reach the conclusion that the prosecution does not have to prove the absence of self-defense. Id. (citing Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. at 210).
96. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 85, at 21-29. It has been held that "The
Ohio Constitution requires that every indictment allege that the offense is 'against the
peace and dignity of the State of Ohio.' Art. IV, Section 20, Ohio Constitution. This
language has been equated to an allegation of unlawfulness." State v. Tuncle, No.
38424 (Cuyahoga County, Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 8, 1979).
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ported by State v. Tuncle,91 a recent Ohio court of appeals decision.
Unlike Cherry, the Tuncle court did not limit its analysis of proving affirmative defenses to statutory law, but also examined the requirements of the Ohio Constitution.9 8
In Tuncle, the defendant borrowed money from the deceased and

was derelict in repayment. The deceased, after receiving a bad check
from the defendant, accosted the defendant's wife and informed her if
the loan was not repaid by the following day, "there will be some
blood shed." 99 The next day, Tuncle visited the deceased's home. Tuncle testified that during a conversation with the deceased, he shot the
deceased while the victim was reaching for a gun. Tuncle claimed that
he acted in self-defense. The defendant was convicted of voluntary
manslaughter and aggravated assault. Tuncle appealed his conviction.
The trial court improperly placed the burden of proving self-defense
upon the accused and the appellate court remanded. At the time of the
trial, unamended section 2901.05(A)' 00 was in effect. Upon retrial,
Tuncle was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter and acquitted of
aggravated assault. The defendant appealed this conviction, claiming
that the prosecution must prove the absence of self-defense beyond a
reasonable doubt. 10 '
Although the manslaughter was affirmed, 102 the second appellate
opinion concluded "that self-defense negates the allegation of
unlawfulness which is required to be proven by the State upon a charge
The Ohio statute on voluntary
of voluntary manslaughter."''
97. State v. Tuncle, No. 38424 (Cuyahoga County, Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 8, 1979).
98. Id. slip op. at 6-8.
99. Id. at 2.
100. Under the unamended statute the defendant did not have the burden of proving an affirmative defense by a preponderance. See text accompanying notes 9-12
supra.
101. State v. Tuncle, No. 38424, slip op. at 2 (Cuyahoga County, Ohio Ct. App.
Mar. 8, 1979).
102. Id. at 8. The appellate court held that the record contained sufficient evidence
on the issue of self-defense so that reasonable jurors could have disagreed as to the
affirmative defense and declined to find the evidence insufficient as a matter of law.
Id.
103. Id. at 7. Compare id. with Frazier v. Weatherholtz, 572 F.2d 994 (4th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978), which involved a petition for habeas corpus
by a prisoner convicted of first degree murder. The court held that an instruction given
by a Virginia trial court that the defendant had to prove self-defense by raising in the
minds of the jury a reasonable doubt as to whether or not he acted in the lawful exercise of self-defense did not shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant and was not
unconstitutional. 572 F.2d at 995.
H.B. 1168 can be readily distinguished. In Frazier, the defendant only had the
burden to raise in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt that he lawfully acted in
self-defense. H.B. 1168, however, shifts the burden of persuasion to the defendant to
prove by a preponderance that he lawfully acted in self-defense.
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manslaughter does not include unlawfulness as one of the elements of
the crime. 0 The court in Tuncle, however, reviewed the requirements
of the Ohio Constitution to find that self-defense negates the element
of unlawfulness alleged in every criminal indictment. The Ohio Constitution states: "The style of all process shall be, 'The State of Ohio;'
all prosecutions shall be carried on, in the name, and by the authority,
of the state of Ohio; and all indictments shall conclude, 'against the
peace and dignity of the state of Ohio.'"""0 Tuncle adopted the interpretation of this provision which was offered in Hamilton v. Alvis. '0 6
Hamilton involved a habeas corpus petition. Hamilton construed the
language of the Ohio Constitution to mean that each indictment must
contain an allegation that the act was unlawful."' Tuncle also found
that this language required an allegation of unlawfulness." 8
After establishing that the Ohio Constitution requires a general
allegation of unlawfulness in every criminal indictment, the Tuncle
court stated that "[u]nlawfulness is a fact to be proved by the State in
a prosecution for voluntary manslaughter."'0 9 Interpreting both
Mullaney and Patterson, the court held "it is a violation of due process to require the accused to prove an affirmative defense which
negates an element of the crime charged.""'
In reviewing these
104. Ohio's voluntary manslaughter statute provides: "(A) No person, while under
extreme emotional stress brought on by serious provocation reasonably sufficient to incite him into using deadly force, shall knowingly cause the death of another. (B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of voluntary manslaughter, a felony of the first
degree." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.03 (Page 1975).
105. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 20.
106. 109 Ohio App. 298, 160 N.E.2d 372 (1959). Hamilton involved a petition for
habeas corpus by an inmate in the Ohio Penitentiary. The defendant was convicted of
larceny. He contended that the indictment was contrary to statutory form and that he
was found guilty by a plea entered by the court on his behalf. His petition was denied
on the grounds that the indictment was sufficient and that the record indicated the
defendant entered the guilty plea himself. Id.
107. Id. at 301, 160 N.E.2d at 374. "The indictment concludes with the allegation
that the criminal acts described were 'contrary to the form of the statute in such case
made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state of Ohio.' This is a
clear allegation that the acts were unlawful." Id. See also Broyles v. Commonwealth,
267 S.W.2d 73 (Ky. 1954), where the Kentucky Court of Appeals stated "[i]n the legal
sense, peace and quietude signify obedience to law, public quiet, good order and tranquility." Id. at 75. It is a valid legal conclusion that an act against the peace and dignity of the state is unlawful.
108. State v. Tuncle, No. 38424, slip op. at 6-7 (Cuyahoga County, Ohio Ct. App.
Mar. 8, 1979).
109. Id. at 6.
110. Id/. In addition to citing Hamilton and the indictment provision of the Ohio
Constitution, the court referred to other sections of the constitution and determined
that "there is a serious question as to whether the state could eliminate the element of
unlawfulness or could attempt to make it a crime to kill a person in self defense." Id.
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Supreme Court decisions, Tuncle found that self-defense negates the
element of unlawfulness charged in the Ohio indictment process."'
Tuncle stated that, in the past, courts have found that self-defense is a
lawful act."' In Mullaney, the Court explained that "[a]t early common law only those homicides committed in the enforcement of justice
were considered justifiable; all others were deemed unlawful .... Between the 13th and 16th centuries the class of justifiable homicides expanded to include . . . those committed in self-defense."" ' 3 Selfdefense is a lawful act negating the element of unlawfulness which the
prosecution must prove in a criminal proceeding."' Tuncle held that
because self-defense negates unlawfulness, the prosecution must prove
the absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict an accused of a crime." '
D.

The effect of H.B. 1168

H.B. 1168 requires the accused to prove an affirmative defense by
a preponderance of the evidence." 6 This requirement is not easily
reconcilable with the indictment procedures set forth by the Ohio Constitution which have been held to require unlawfulness to be an element of every crime.I " Requiring the accused to prove that his act was
To support this statement the court referred to two sections of the Ohio Constitution.
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 1 provides: "All men are, by nature, free and independent,
and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending
life and ...obtaining safety."
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 4 provides: "The people have the right to bear arms for their
defense and security .... " For the Tuncle court, these provisions clearly made selfdefense a lawful act.
111. State v. Tuncle, No. 38424, slip op. at 6-7 (Cuyahoga County, Ohio Ct. App.
Mar. 8, 1979).
112. "[A]ctions will be held justifiable upon the ground of self-defense in all cases
where he [an aggressor] has withdrawn from an affray ...in good faith. . . ." State v.
Melchior, 56 Ohio St. 2d 15, 21, 381 N.E.2d 195, 199 (1978) (quoting WHARTON'S
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 232 (Anderson 1966)).
113. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 692 (1975).
114. State v. Tuncle, No. 38424, slip op. at 7 (Cuyahoga County, Ohio Ct. App.
Mar. 8, 1979).
115. Id.at 8.
116. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.05(A) (Page Supp. 1979). See text accompanying notes 3 and 4 supra.
117. Hamilton v. Alvis, 109 Ohio App. 298, 160 N.E.2d 372 (1959); State v.
Tuncle, No. 38424 (Cuyahoga County, Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 8, 1979). See text accompanying notes 97-107 supra.
As previously mentioned, the court in Cherry v. Jago, No. C-77-269A (N.D. Ohio
Dec. 19, 1979), did not address the petitioner's contention that unlawfulness is an element of a crime which is negated by coming forward with the evidence of self-defense.
See note 96 and accompanying text supra. The Cherry court stated that "'a plea of self
defense is inconsistent with the claim that the defendant did not commit the homicide.'" Cherry v. Jago, No. C-77-269A, slip op. at 10 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 19, 1979)
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lawful shifts the burden to the defendant to disprove an essential fact
of the criminal charge. H.B. 1168 requires the defendant to negate

unlawfulness by proving self-defense by a preponderance of the
evidence. The burden placed upon the defendant is constitutionally infirm and inconsistent with Mullaney and Patterson.
In Mullaney, the statute created a presumption of implied malice
when it shifted to the defendant the burden of proving that he acted in
the heat of passion on sudden provocation."' H.B. 1168 is similar to
the Maine statute in Mullaney. H.B. 1168 creates a presumption of implied unlawfulness by shifting to the accused the burden of proving
that his actions in self-defense were lawful. By presuming
unlawfulness, the burden of proving an element of a criminal charge
shifts to the defendant.
Mullaney was concerned with protecting the individual's due process interest in his liberty and reputation."' H.B. 1168 invades these
(quoting 27 0. JUR. 2d Homicide § 89 (1957)). Compare id. with 27 0. JUR. 2d § 2
(1957) ("Homicide means the unlawful killing of a human being by another person."
(emphasis added). This is a common law definition of homicide and Ohio has since
adopted a criminal code. Although unlawfulness is not a statutory element of murder,
due process safeguards are not rendered unavailable because of a statutory scheme.
[I]f Winship were limited to those facts that constitute a crime as defined by state
law, a State could undermine many of the interests that decision sought to protect
without effecting any substantive change in its law. It would only be necessary to
redefine the elements that constitute different crimes, characterizing them as factors that bear solely on the extent of punishment.
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698 (1975). It logically follows that an element does
not have to be specifically mentioned in a criminal statute before due process requires
the state to prove that element beyond a reasonable doubt.
118. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 688-90 (1975).
119. Id. at 697-704.
Mullaney's holding, it is argued, is that the State may not permit the blameworthiness of an act or the severity of punishment authorized for its commission to depend on the presence or absence of an identified fact without assuming the burden
of proving the presence or absence of that fact, as the case may be, beyond a
reasonable doubt. In our view, the Mullaney holding should not be so broadly
read.
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 214-15 (1977). In a footnote, the Patterson
Court stated that "There is some language in Mullaney that has been understood as
perhaps construing the Due Process Clause to require the prosecution to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt any fact affecting 'the degree of criminal culpability' . . . . The
Court did not intend Mullaney to have such far-reaching effect." Id. at 214-15 n.15.
Mullaney was not expressly overruled for addressing the due process safeguards affecting criminal culpability, but rather, was only qualified in uncertain terms. Id.
H.B. 1168 does not merely affect any fact affecting the degree of criminal culpability. H.B. 1168, by requiring a defendant to prove self-defense by a preponderance,
shifts the burden to the accused to negate unlawfulness which is an integral element of
a crime under the Ohio indictment process. See notes 105-09 and accompanying text
supra.
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interests. The legislation requires the defendant to bear the burden of
proving that he acted in a lawful manner. This has a direct effect on
criminal culpability because the new law assumes the accused is to
blame. The presumption that the accused acted unlawfully stigmatizes
his reputation as a law-abiding citizen and increases the likelihood of
imprisonment if he is unable to meet his burden of proof.
The Supreme Court in Patterson noted that "[i]t would be an
abuse of affirmative defenses, as it would be of presumptions in the
criminal law, if the purpose or effect were to unhinge the procedural
presumption of innocence which historically and constitutionally
shields one charged with a crime." 1 20 Because H.B. 1168 requires a
defendant to bear the burden of proving self-defense, it presumes he
acted unlawfully. This conclusive presumption of unlawfulness obviates the overriding historical and constitutional procedural presumption of innocence.
Patterson held that the defendant could constitutionally bear the
burden of proving extreme emotional disturbance because the defense
did not bear a direct relationship to any element of murder under the
New York law."'2 Unlike the law in Patterson, the Ohio Constitution
makes unlawfulness an element of any criminal charge. Self-defense
bears a direct relationship to unlawfulness because a defendant who
asserts self-defense must prove that he acted lawfully.
The Ohio Supreme Court, in Frost, interpreted Patterson to say
that "an affirmative defense, which does not negate any facts of the
crime which the state must prove in order to convict, constitutes a
separate issue concerning which the defendant is required to carry the
burden of proof." 2 ' Unlawfulness is not a separate issue which the accused may constitutionally bear the burden of disproving. Ohio courts
have held that the Ohio Constitution integrates unlawfulness into every
indictment.' 23 Self-defense is a lawful act which negates the allegation
of unlawfulness. Requiring a defendant to bear the burden of proof
for an affirmative defense which negates an element of a crime is unconstitutional. H.B. 1168 compels a defendant to bear this burden.
H.B. 1168, in its present form, would not pass a constitutional
analysis.

120. 432 U.S. at 211 n.13 (quoting People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 305-07,
347 N.E.2d 898, 909-10, 383 N.Y.S. 571, 583 (1976) (Breitel, C.J., concurring)).
121. Id. at 210.
122. State v. Frost, 57 Ohio St. 2d 121, 127, 387 N.E.2d 235, 239 (1979).
123. Hamilton v. Alvis, 109 Ohio App. 298, 160 N.E.2d 372 (1959); State v.
Tuncle, No. 38424 (Cuyahoga County, Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 8, 1979).
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CONCLUSION

The constitutionality of H.B. 1168 is problematic because it requires a defendant to prove self-defense and negate the element of
unlawfulness. The bill obviates the procedural presumption of innocence by presuming that the accused acted unlawfully. Although
H.B. 1168 has not been tested, a court which integrates the Ohio Constitution with the criminal charge will find that section 2901.05(A) contravenes Winship, Mullaney, and Patterson.
Further legislative attention to this enactment is crucial. A solution
for assigning this burden, however, will be difficult because Mullaney
and Patterson are ambiguous with regard to when it is proper for the
accused to bear the burden of proving an affirmative defense.
Randall J. Kay
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